China’s ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ Breakdown: Technology’s Role in Shaping Warfare

This article is part of a series examining the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) white paper “Unrestricted Warfare” from 1999. You can read part one here.

In this series, we delve into the comprehensive analysis presented in “Unrestricted Warfare,” a strategic paper by Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Here we explore technology’s profound impact on warfare and the need for adapting military strategies to the evolving global landscape.

Qiao is a retired Chinese air force officer and a People’s Liberation Army National Defense University professor, while Wang is a former colonel in the Chinese military and a professor at Beihang University in Beijing.

Technology is the Totem of Modern Man

Qiao and Wang open their paper by emphasizing the transformative power of technology in the past century. The rapid growth of technology and humanity’s insatiable appetite for innovation has led to unforeseen consequences, referred to as the “ramification effect.” This effect illustrates how the emergence of new technologies sets off a chain reaction involving second and third-order repercussions that are often not immediately apparent.

The authors use the example of the automobile to demonstrate the ramification effect, where advancements in transportation technology significantly impacted industries like mining, smelting, manufacturing, and oil refining. Despite being officers of a communist country, Qiao and Wang contemplate the ethical cost of runaway technological progress and show a depth of thinking that considers both initial and long-term implications.

Decentralization and Global Integration

The paper emphasizes that technology has decentralized power and facilitated global integration. This highlights the growing interdependence of nations and actors on a worldwide stage. Consequently, Qiao and Wang stress that no single entity can dominate the world, aligning with the theme introduced in the preface.

“The Weapons Revolution Which Invariably Comes First”

The authors delve into the historical impact of weapons technology revolutions, such as iron and bronze spears, the bow, gunpowder, and modern weapons like tanks and airplanes. However, they argue that new weapons are part of a more extensive system in the current era of globalization and are unlikely to revolutionize warfare independently. They point out that most contemporary weapons are dependent on existing technologies, leaving little genuinely “new” technology on the horizon.

Speaking at the Aspen Institute on Monday, CISA director Jen Easterly warned… In the event of a conflict, China will almost certainly use aggressive cyber operations to go after our critical infrastructure to include pipelines and rail lines to delay military deployment and to… pic.twitter.com/Sgy3Z804HP

— SHO’NUFF (@IAMSHO_NUFF) June 20, 2023

“Fighting the Fight That Fits One’s Weapons” vs. “Making the Weapons To Fit the Fight”

Qiao and Wang delve into a thought-provoking comparison of two distinct approaches to warfare: fighting with the weapons available and developing weapons tailored to specific tactics. On the one hand, initially, the concept of “Fighting the fight that fits one’s weapons” may appear to be a passive and backward approach as this mindset suggests using the available weapons and adapting tactics to leverage their capabilities. Both authors argued that even advanced nations like the United States are not exempt from constraints when facing lower-tier opponents. While higher-tier nations may possess cutting-edge technology, they may find themselves challenged to effectively utilize it against adversaries employing unorthodox and asymmetrical tactics. Blindly relying on high-tech weapons and assuming that technological superiority guarantees victory can lead to disastrous outcomes. This highlights the authors’ emphasis on understanding the limitations and vulnerabilities of relying solely on advanced weaponry in warfare.

On the other hand, the authors present the approach of “Making the weapons to fit the fight,” which calls for developing weapons systems tailored to specific tactics. In this model, tactics and strategies are determined first, and then weapons systems are designed to align with those chosen tactics. Qiao and Wang use the example of the U.S. AirLand Battle doctrine and the evolution of digitized warfare to illustrate this approach. Nevertheless, the authors caution that this method has its pitfalls. The gravest risk lies in developing ineffective weapons against unconventional or low-tech adversaries. As they point out, the U.S. military found it challenging to counter unconventional warfare and low-tech tactics in Somalia, leading to difficulties for high-tech troops in dealing with non-conventional threats.

The GWOT Implications

The analysis offered by Qiao and Wang serves as a prescient warning, especially in the context of modern conflicts such as the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The strategic decisions made in Iraq, for instance, were aimed at engaging the enemy in a terrain favorable to mechanized warfare. It highlights the importance of considering the dynamics of a particular conflict and understanding the enemy’s tactics before developing weapon systems. Following the “Making the weapons to fit the fight” approach requires strategic foresight and the flexibility to adapt weapon systems to suit evolving battlefield conditions.

Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of a nuanced and multifaceted approach to warfare, underscoring the significance of studying the enemy’s methods, tactics, and strategies before deciding on the most appropriate weaponry. By understanding the adversary’s strengths and weaknesses, nations can effectively counter threats, whether conventional or unconventional, and design a comprehensive military strategy that maximizes the potential of their weapons and tactics.