The battle between Russia and Ukraine has sparked a rush in the Defense Department to break down the walls between the commercial sector and itself. This alliance has caused a sudden surge of activity in the European Command to incorporate more commercial solutions, such as combining and sharing data obtained from various vendors through Starlink’s satellites with those in Ukraine. The urgency of the war has also prompted the Defense Department to fuse data to produce a common operating picture of transportation operations, including a central hub that is providing weapons to Ukraine. On top of that, the war has pushed vendors to create “MacGyver solutions” like L3 Harris and Raytheon’s VAMPIRE counter-drone system.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has not been developing new technology but rather putting existing tech to novel uses and expanding the scope of its implementations. Only some capabilities would be applicable in a conflict with China, but certain ones, such as utilizing commercial space-based communications and sensors, would be invaluable. Moreover, the DoD must make their organizational changes permanent rather than relying only on them in times of crisis. As demonstrated over the past eight years, the DoD is only sometimes as successful in this regard in peacetime. Securing and institutionalizing these advances would make the Department more successful in swiftly and expansively adopting innovative capabilities.
Boosting Security and Defense
The war has tested the Defense Department’s capacity to engage in security cooperation with a partner nation and other allies worldwide amid a high-intensity conflict. The US provided training and equipment to Ukraine before the war. However, collaboration on operational planning, intelligence sharing, and materiel support has deepened while hostilities have occurred. This has been possible due to Ukraine’s ability to withstand the Kyiv siege. As the tide of the war began to turn, the US security cooperation became more intensive, and it is still being developed and improved. For example, if China attempts to take control of Taiwan, Taiwan may be unable to resist the initial assault without considerable US security cooperation. Nevertheless, political constrictions limit the amount of official interaction between the US and Taiwanese forces, meaning that strategic planning and intelligence sharing would be limited before the start of the war.
The US has long used war as a laboratory for testing new technologies and tactics. The Ukraine-Russia War is no different. The conflict has accelerated the Defense Department’s capability development in several ways:
- It has allowed us to test new weapons systems and tactics against a near-peer adversary.
- It has highlighted the need for more agile acquisition processes to deliver battlefield capabilities quickly.
- It has demonstrated the importance of developing joint operational concepts that can be employed across multiple domains.
- It has underscored the need for better intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to inform decision-making during combat operations.
The US-Ukraine Alliance
The United States’ partnership with Ukraine is vital in its strategy to counter Russian aggression in Europe and beyond. Since 2014, the US government has provided more than $1 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including training, equipment, and other forms of support for its armed forces and defense sector reform efforts. In addition to providing military aid, the US-Ukraine alliance serves as a platform for collaboration on defense research and development projects that could benefit both countries’ militaries.
Implications for U.S.-China Competition
The Ukraine-Russia War also provides valuable lessons for how the United States should prepare itself for competition with China over the next decade or two—namely by investing heavily in research and development (R&D) initiatives that focus on breakthrough capabilities, streamlining acquisition processes, developing joint operational concepts; improving intelligence collection and analysis; and strengthening alliances with likeminded countries around the world who share similar strategic interests vis-à-vis China’s rise as a global power.
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s threat to Taiwan continues, so is the urgency for DoD to have no room for error in tactical planning and information exchange. Significantly, the power of data – the ability to acquire, transmit, analyze, and take action on it and stop opponents from doing the same – is of significant importance during a potential China war. The Defense Department must have smooth procedures to give Taiwan, Japan, and Australia essential information and draw upon their sensor and communication networks to create a shared operational illustration. The Ukraine conflict is offering the Department of Defense essential experience in organizing essential parts of this method. The organization has made it clear that it is not providing targeting data to Ukraine – a heightened level of accuracy and timing that would be critical in a war with China.
The United States is not “actively helping them kill generals of any kind,” the defense official said.
Suppose these organizational changes persist past this war, and the US government applies them to Taiwan. In that case, the Department can combine essential components of its sensing and targeting systems with Taiwan’s, substantially improving the potency and durability when facing attacking Chinese forces.
The United States intelligence community had an early victory in providing the world with information on Vladimir Putin’s decision-making and the Russian war plan before their invasion.
“For months, Biden administration officials had watched warily as Putin massed tens of thousands of troops and lined up tanks and missiles along Ukraine’s borders. As summer waned, Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, had focused on the increasing volume of intelligence related to Russia and Ukraine. He had set up the Oval Office meeting after his own thinking had gone from uncertainty about Russia’s intentions, to concern he was being too skeptical about the prospects of military action, to alarm,” according to WaPo.
This was a stark contrast to previously perceived US intelligence failures, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The security assistance given to Ukraine since 2014 by the US has positively affected the battlefield. Because of the sacrifices and support the United States provides Ukraine, even without a security guarantee, countries such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines observe the US leadership in the coalition supporting the country. If China were to invade Taiwan, US intelligence must offer indications and warnings to Taiwan, the US, and other allies. This would also involve obtaining international support through diplomatic and economic sanctions. The perseverance of the US and its allies in supporting Ukraine despite refugee flows and energy costs could influence Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s opinion on whether the US and its allies would stand up for Taiwan in the long run. Additionally, the fact that the war in Ukraine is a ‘catastrophic strategic disaster’ for Russia could add to any doubts China has about attacking Taiwan.
NOTE: Traditional Deterrence is a strategy employed to prevent an adversary from taking action not desired by the deterring party. It is based on the idea that if the potential attacker is convinced that the cost of attacking will be too great, they will be dissuaded from taking action.
Nevertheless, the war is creating an opening for the US to reduce its investments in Europe and focus more on a China-centric strategy. The destruction of the Russian military on the battlefield, and the economic sanctions imposed on them, made it difficult for Russia to revive its conventional forces. This provides an opportunity to decrease US forces in Europe if European allies invest in their armed services and defense sectors. While Putin is in power, Russia will continue threatening European security, even with a reduced US presence. As a result, NATO will still have military superiority in Europe for the next 5 to 10+ years.
It is essential for NATO allies to be aware that the Pentagon’s post-war approach may include reducing force presence in Europe compared to pre-war levels. This does not mean that the United States will be stepping away from its leadership role within NATO. Rather, it implies that a lower conventional danger in Europe can be addressed with fewer forces. The risk to the 2022 National Defense Strategy is that the Department chooses the opposite path. Unnecessary deployments of troops to the Middle East after March 2019, similar to those which countered the 2018 National Defense Strategy, could lead to sustaining a presence in Europe and taking away resources from the Indo-Pacific region.
The conclusion of the Russia-Ukraine war is uncertain, and the potential for its escalation still exists. Nonetheless, amidst the tragedy of this armed conflict, there is an impetus for drastic reform of the Defense Department and related entities. This momentum, together with the Ukrainian people’s liberation, the decline of the Russian Armed Forces, and Putin’s corrupt rule, is the reward of investments made in Ukraine. The greatest challenge now is to make the most of this reward.
COMMENTS