The fresh Russian Army attack is being prepared, as many of its initial draft’s problems have been solved.

Western nations have already declared that Russia has lost the battle against Ukraine. However, because the timing, expense, and extent of Ukraine’s triumph are unknown, the survival of the independent state of Ukraine is still in question.

However, according to many observers, the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin mobilized military-age men to fight in Ukraine has destroyed Russia’s vaunted domestic political stability for good. Moreover, the sight of thousands of people fleeing the country to avoid being drafted was evidence that Putin had severely miscalculated and risked ruining the regime’s legitimacy at home.

Kremlin cared little about the draft law’s potential to decrease the number of troops at the front; instead, it was crucial to Moscow because it allowed it to mitigate shortages. Because of the presence of mobilized forces in Luhansk, Ukraine could not make significant advances in Lyman, Ukraine, in early October. However, thanks to reinforcements in Kherson, the Russian army could withdraw in an orderly fashion, preventing a repeat of the disastrous losses in Kharkiv. Near Bakhmut, Russian troops even made modest gains at the expense of newly mobilized soldiers and prisoners.

Despite the fact that the Russians were recently drafted and lacked equipment, training, and motivation, the Ukrainians’ better morale and superior technology have not prevented Russia from achieving its interim military objectives at a relatively modest political cost. What would another million troops do if the arrival of a few tens of thousands was sufficient to accomplish that?

Government of Russia meeting
Government of Russia meeting (Source:

The Russian government was limited this autumn in its first attempt to mobilize troops because of the public’s hostility to forced conscription and the absence of essential equipment for new recruits. Weapons, clothing, and even food were unavailable, reducing the military value of the new recruits, and Putin’s approval ratings plunged as a result of the unpopular nature of the initiative.

As a result of Anatoly Serdyukov’s effective army reforms, both issues have been at least partially addressed. The Kremlin outsourced most of its military procurement to Russia’s more effective civilian bureaucracy, following Serdyukov’s example. In addition, two prominent technocrats—Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin—were appointed to guarantee that the military’s material needs were adequately met.

It is not to say that the difficulties with the armed forces’ supplies will be fixed. However, taking supply management out of military brass hands will almost certainly result in some improvements. Furthermore, average Russians are expected to assist their friends and family members who have been drafted. They will do so to keep their loved ones warm and fed, who have been mobilized to protect them from cold and hunger.